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Andrew Blair-stanek 
Profits as Commercial Success 
abstract.   Courts often use the extent of a patented invention’s commercial success as 
crucial nontechnical proof of the patent’s validity. Relying on misguided economic reasoning, 
most courts use revenue as the primary yardstick for commercial success. This Note argues that 
courts instead should use profits as the proper measure of an invention’s commercial success. 
Current jurisprudence’s use of revenue reflects the flawed premise that firms maximize revenues 
rather than maximizing profits. As a result, courts will often find commercial success when the 
financial data suggest otherwise and vice versa. This Note find s the accounting and economic 
issues involved to be insubstantial, while requiring a threshold profit showing could materially 
further judicial economy.  
author.  Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2008. Microsoft Corporation, Software Design 
Engineer, 2000-05. Princeton University, Mathematics, A.B. 2000. Many thanks to Ian Ayres, 
Jennifer Kinsbruner Bush, George Priest, Roberta Romano, and Amanda Aikman for their 
extremely valuable contributions, as well as to my father and grandfather for their inspiration.  
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introduction  
Patent litigation typically involves highly technical issues.1 Fact-finding 
responsibility, however, falls to juries and judges who rarely have a technical 
background and who virtually never have one in the specific field of the patents 
in question.2 The vast majority of patent disputes require the fact-finder to 
determine whether the underlying invention meets the core statutory 
requirement of not being obvious.3 Courts have developed a number of 
nontechnical, “secondary” considerations to aid the nonobviousness inquiry, 
with commercial success being the most commonly employed. If an invention 
met with commercial success, the reasoning goes, the likelihood increases that 
it was not obvious to competitors who otherwise would have been motivated to 
develop it themselves. But what evidence should prove commercial success? 
Ask economists or businesspeople what motivates businesses, and they will 
tell you profits. The pursuit of profits drives the creation of new businesses and 
investment in existing ones. Accountants’ income statements typically put the 
 
1.  The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), which makes the initial determination of 
patentability, is staffed with technical experts. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Patent 
Operations, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dacp/peg/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2007) 
(“Patent Operations has more than 3500 highly skilled scientists and engineers.”); U.S. 
Patent & Trademark Office, Patent Examiner Qualifications, 
http://www.uspto.gov/go/ac/ahrpa/ohr/jobs/qualifications.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2007) 
(listing technical or science degrees that qualify one as a patent examiner). As a result, 
commercial success is less determinative than it is in nontechnical courts. On commercial 
success, see infra Part I.  
2.  Justice Frankfurter noted: 
It is an old observation that the training of Anglo-American judges ill fits them to 
discharge the duties cast upon them by patent legislation. The scientific 
attainments of a Lord Moulton are perhaps unique in the annals of the English-
speaking judiciary. However, so long as the Congress, for the purposes of 
patentability, makes the determination of originality a judicial function, judges 
must overcome their scientific incompetence as best they can. 
  Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 60-61 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (footnote omitted). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has several 
notable exceptions to this rule: Judge Pauline Newman (doctorate in chemistry), Judge Alan 
D. Lourie (doctorate in chemistry), Judge Richard Linn (bachelor’s in electrical 
engineering), and Judge Kimberly Ann Moore (bachelor’s and master’s in electrical 
engineering). See John D. Collier, How To Win in the Federal Circuit’s Patent Trial Division, 
INTELL . PROP. TODAY, Jan. 2002, at 22, 22; United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, Judicial Biographies, http://fedcir.gov/judgbios.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2007).   
3.  35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000); see also infra note 9 and accompanying text. Empirically, 
obviousness is the leading basis for finding a patent invalid in litigation. John R. Allison & 
Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 208 
(1998). 
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profit figure on the “bottom line,” which has become a synonym for 
paramount consideration.4 
Current commercial success jurisprudence, however, works from the 
misconception that businesses are motivated by revenue. This Note will show 
how this flawed economic assumption can easily lead to erroneous 
determinations of patent validity and encourage abuses of the patent system. 
Part I traces the origins and rise of commercial success as one of the most 
important determinants of patent validity—and the justification for using 
commercial success, a nontechnical variable, as evidence for making an 
essentially technical decision. Part II describes situations in which equating 
commercial success with revenues leads to the wrong decision on patent 
validity, even to the point of encouraging abuse of the patent system. Part III 
touches on how courts can judge profitability and considers how using 
profitability could actually further judicial economy. Finally, Part IV refutes a 
potential normative argument for using revenue instead of profits. 
i. commercial success’s key role in patent law  
A patent is analogous to a deed in real property—but instead of specifying 
ownership of certain land, a patent specifies ownership of a particular area of 
technology.5 While a county recorder’s office maintains records of real property 
deeds, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) examines applications and 
determines whether and what patents to grant. Just as an owner of real 
property may sue for trespass, a patentee may sue for infringement. 
An accused infringer will almost always counterclaim that the patent in 
question is invalid,6 essentially arguing that the patent does not meet the 
statutory requirements for patentability and that the PTO erred in issuing the 
patent. Accused infringers have greater incentives and resources to find proof 
of invalidity than does the PTO. As a result, roughly half of all patent 
infringement cases result in the invalidation of part or all of the patent, and 
litigants hotly contest validity.7 
 
4.  See RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY  245 (2d ed. 1993) (defining “bottom line” as 
“the deciding or crucial factor”).  
5.  See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 (1917); In re 
Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 391 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (comparing the claims in a patent to the “metes 
and bounds of a deed identif[ying] a plot of land”).  
6.  Often, the accused infringer will only need to invalidate the subset of claims that form the 
basis of the infringement suit to prevail and hence will limit the invalidity challenge to that 
subset.  
7.  Allison & Lemley, supra note 3, at 205 (forty-six percent invalid). Overall, patentees, who 
must prove both validity and infringement to prevail, only win approximately twenty-five 
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The most frequent statutory basis for a finding of invalidity is that the 
patented invention is obvious.8 The U.S. Patent Act provides: 
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject 
matter sought to be patented and the prior [technology] are such that 
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the 
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the . . . 
[relevant] subject matter . . . .9 
Commentators have noted that nonobviousness is the greatest hurdle to 
receiving or enforcing a patent, calling it “the ultimate condition of 
patentability.”10 
Determining nonobviousness presents two substantial challenges to the 
judge or jury.11 First, the fact-finder is virtually never a “person having 
ordinary skill” in the relevant technology. Second, the point of reference is the 
time of the invention, while litigation often arises many years later, during 
which time the field has made substantial progress.12 
Consider one typical case involving nonobviousness, in which the parties 
contested a patent on the antibiotic Cipro, invented twenty-one years before 
the litigation. The fact-finder determined that a “person of ordinary skill” at 
the time of its invention “would have had a Ph.D. in chemistry, organic 
chemistry or microbiology,”13 with “several years of work experience in the 
pharmaceutical industry designing drugs.”14 In this case, the fact-finder not 
only had to view an invention from the perspective of an extraordinarily skilled 
scientist, he also had to do so while ignoring twenty-one years of hindsight and 
 
percent of cases. Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 
AIPLA Q.J. 1, 5-6 (2006).  
8.  Allison & Lemley, supra note 3, at 208 tbl.1. 
9.  35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000) (emphasis added). 
10.  Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on 
Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803, 812 (1988) (quoting N ONOBVIOUSNESS —THE ULTIMATE 
CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY  (John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980)).  
11.  Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (“Under § 103, the scope and content of the 
prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are 
to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this 
background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined.”). 
12.  See, e.g., In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (warning against hindsight); 
see also Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight 
Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391 (2006). 
13.  Bayer AG v. Carlsbad Tech., Inc., No. 01CV0867-B, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27830, at *11 
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2002). 
14.  Id. 
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progress! While this task would challenge a panel of luminaries in the field, it 
poses a far greater challenge to a generalist judge or jury of laypersons.  
To aid fact-finders presented with such thorny challenges, courts have 
developed the nontechnical “secondary considerations” of nonobviousness. 
These include long-felt need, failure of others, professional approval, and, 
most importantly, commercial success.15 Although a patent case could proceed 
without invoking any of these secondary considerations, in practice, litigants 
often marshal all possible arguments, including commercial success.  
A. The Growing Importance of Commercial Success 
The Supreme Court has recognized commercial success as a possible 
determinant of patent validity since 1876.16 In 1966, with the landmark 
decision of Graham v. John Deere Co.,17 the Court reaffirmed the vitality of 
secondary considerations “[a]s indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness.”18 
The Court listed commercial success as the first secondary consideration.19 
In 1982, Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and 
gave it exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases from any federal 
district court.20 Congress aimed to create national uniformity in patent law, 
which had previously suffered from circuit splits that distorted investment 
 
15.  See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17 (listing “commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure 
of others, etc.” (emphasis added)); Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (giving extra weight to the Graham factors, of which commercial 
success is the first); see also Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Can. Pac.  Ry., 254 F. Supp. 2d 527, 570 
(E.D. Pa. 2003) (“Secondary considerations that may be taken into account are: (1) long-felt 
but unsolved need; (2) commercial success; (3) failed efforts of others; (4) copying by 
others; (5) praise for the invention; (7) [sic] unexpected results; (8) disbelief of experts; (9) 
general skepticism of those in the art; (10) commercial acquiescence; and (11) simultaneous 
development.”). See generally 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS  § 5.05 (2007). 
16.  Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486, 495-96 (1876) (stating that the 
general use of an invention is always a factor to be considered in determining validity and 
noting that in a close case “it is sufficient to turn the scale”). Courts and commentators had 
long employed commercial success and the other secondary considerations as indicia of 
patentability. See Richard L. Robbins, Note, Subtests of “Nonobviousness”: A Nontechnical 
Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1964); see also Edmund W. Kitch, 
Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 293, 330-35 
(examining the logical underpinnings of commercial success’s relevance).  
17.  383 U.S. 1 (first Supreme Court decision interpreting the Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-
593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376)). 
18.  Id. at 18. 
19.  Id. at 17-18. 
20.  Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127(a), 96 Stat. 25, 37-39 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000)). 
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decisions. For example, a company deciding where to build a factory that could 
arguably infringe on a competitor’s patent might choose a location within a 
circuit with more favorable patent law jurisprudence.21 Commentators agree 
that the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence has vastly increased the weight given to 
commercial success.22 
In one of its earliest rulings, the Federal Circuit found that a district court 
committed reversible error by excluding consideration of commercial success.23 
One commentator writes, “the Federal Circuit has transformed commercial 
success from a tiebreaker to a virtual trump card.”24 Moreover, “[s]everal 
Federal Circuit judges have waged a prolonged campaign to discredit the 
‘secondary’ label”25 assigned to factors such as commercial success by Graham. 
 
21.  The House Report concluded,  
At present, the validity of a patient [sic] is too dependent upon geography (i.e., 
the accident of judicial venue) to make effective business planning possible. It is 
particularly difficult for small businesses to make useful and knowledgeable 
investment decisions where patents are involved when they fear a patent may be 
tied up for years in expensive litigation and when the standard of patentability 
varies from circuit to circuit. A single court of appeals for patent cases will 
promote certainty where it is lacking to a significant degree and will reduce, if not 
eliminate, the forum-shopping that now occurs. 
  H.R. REP. N O. 97-312, at 22 (1981) (internal citations omitted). Congress also aimed to 
relieve the workload of the regional circuits, id. at 27, and make better use of existing judicial 
resources, id. at 24. See generally 4 CHISUM, supra note 15, § 11.06[3][e][i] (2005 & Supp. 
2005). 
22.  See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER , THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 305 (2003); Merges, supra note 10, at 820-26; Reed W.L. 
Marcy, Note, Patent Law’s Nonobviousness Requirement: The Effect of Inconsistent Standards 
Regarding Commercial Success on the Individual Inventor, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT . L.J. 199 
(1996). Landes and Posner consider this trend odd, since commercial success helps 
nontechnical judges make validity decisions, while the Federal Circuit has more technical 
expertise than any other federal court. LANDES & POSNER , supra. 
23.  Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
24.  Merges, supra note 10, at 827; see also Marcy, supra note 22, at 215-16; Dorothy Whelan, 
Note, A Critique of the Use of Secondary Considerations in Applying the Section 103 
Nonobviousness Test for Patentability, 28 B.C. L. REV. 357, 358-59 (1987). Marcy also argues 
that the Federal Circuit’s commercial success jurisprudence harms predictability for small 
individual inventors and leads to inefficiently high investment in developing existing 
inventions rather than engaging in further research. Marcy, supra note 22, at 216-17. 
25.  Merges, supra note 10, at 834; see Howard T. Markey, Why Not the Statute?, 65 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 331, 338-39 (1983) (calling them the “the misnamed ‘secondary considerations’” 
(emphasis added)); Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the “Invention” Requirement, 1 APLA 
Q.J. 26, 38 (1972) (“There is just one unfortunate word in [Graham’s secondary factors] 
passage: ‘secondary.’ I don’t think it should be given any weight though some courts seem 
to have done so . . . .”). 
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B. Theoretical Justifications 
Commercial success has huge practical advantages as a mode of proof in 
patent litigation, particularly because of its accessibility to nontechnical judges 
and juries. It also has strong theoretical justifications under the two economic 
theories of patent law with the widest acceptance in scholarly writings and case 
law: classical theory and prospect theory.26  
1. Classical Theory 
The classical economic theory of patents sees them as a mechanism for 
inducing inventive activity and disclosure by providing the reward of 
monopoly protection. The potential for commercial success presumably 
provides incentives for others to try to perfect the invention, and the failure of 
others to do so suggests nonobviousness. Put most simply, the classical theory-
based argument goes, “if an invention is both obvious and lucrative, why 
wasn’t it thought of earlier?”27 
 
26.  There are actually five economic theories of patent law: rewards, patent-induced, prospect 
theory, race-to-invent, and rent dissipation. See generally A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified 
Economic Theories of Patents—the Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71 N OTRE DAME L. REV. 267 (1996) 
(discussing the various theories of patent law and investigating their predictions). The two 
“classical” economic theories are the rewards theory and the patent-induced theory. These 
theories are really two sides of the same coin, in that an incentive to invent ex ante becomes 
an ex post reward for success. This Note consequently refers to the rewards theory and 
patent-induced theory together as “the classical theory.”  
The classical and prospect theories are the most prominent in scholarly writings. See, 
e.g., Ann Bartow, Separating Marketing Innovation from Actual Invention: A Proposal for a New, 
Improved, Lighter, and Better-Tasting Form of Patent Protection, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. 
L. 1, 14 (2000) (noting that classical reward-based theory and prospect theory are “the two 
predominant economic theories of patents”). The classical theory has a long-standing basis 
in the case law. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966) (adopting the patent-
induced theory by referring to “the inducement of the patent” (emphasis added)).  
Scholars, however, have found that prospect theory also explains much of the Federal 
Circuit’s jurisprudence. See, e.g., Kevin Rhodes, Comment, The Federal Circuit’s Patent 
Nonobviounesss Standards: Theoretical Perspectives on Recent Doctrinal Changes, 85 N W. U. L. 
REV. 1051, 1094-1100 (1991). In addition to producing reasoning and results fully consistent 
with prospect theory, several Federal Circuit cases have cited directly to Edmund Kitch’s 
seminal 1977 article, Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. 
& ECON . 265 (1977), which first introduced prospect theory. E.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 640 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Newman, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part), rev’d on other grounds, 535 U.S. 722 (2002); Hilton Davis 
Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
27.  LANDES & POSNER , supra note 22, at 305. 
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If one breaks down this reasoning into component parts, commercial 
success implies nonobviousness with the aid of four inferences: 
First, that the commercial success is due to the innovation. Second, that 
if an improvement has in fact become commercially successful, it is 
likely that this potential commercial success was perceived before its 
development. Third, the potential commercial success having been 
perceived, it is likely that efforts were made to develop the 
improvement. Fourth, the efforts having been made by [persons skilled 
in the field], they failed because the patentee was the first to reduce his 
development to practice.28 
Arguably, the first inference—that the commercial success is due to the 
patented invention—is the weakest of the four. Courts have responded to this 
by requiring that a patentee show a nexus between the commercial success and 
the patent itself.29 To have probative value, the commercial success cannot 
result from nontechnical business prowess or from technical features not 
covered in the patents-in-suit.30 For example, courts have found the nexus 
severed by factors such as superior advertising, market power, or unpatented 
features.31 With these logical inferences and the requirement of a nexus, 
commercial success provides a proxy for nonobviousness. 
2. Prospect Theory 
Prospect theory32 posits that the patent system acts like the system for 
assigning mining rights to U.S. public lands.33 Just as granting mineral rights 
 
28.  Kitch, supra note 16, at 332. 
29.  Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Solder Removal Co. 
v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 582 F.2d 628, 637 (C.C.P.A. 1978). Note, however, that some 
commentators think the Federal Circuit has not sufficiently heeded precedent about what 
can negate a showing of nexus, such as marketing or business acumen. E.g., Merges, supra 
note 10, at 827.  
30.  See generally 2 CHISUM, supra note 15, § 5.05[2][f] (reviewing cases finding and severing 
nexus). 
31.  See, e.g., Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1027 (1985). See generally 2 
CHISUM, supra note 15, § 5.05[2][f][i]. 
32.  The prospect theory in patent law has no relation to the area of behavioral economics of the 
same name. The former derives its name from analogy to mining prospects, whereas the 
latter refers to how humans perceive the prospects of gains or losses. On the area of 
behavioral economics called prospect theory, see Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA  263 (1979); and 
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000). 
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on tracts over public lands encourages prospecting and mining, granting 
property rights on an area of technology encourages its development.34 Patents 
give assurances of the exclusive right to develop and market a technology 
without the danger of free riding by others. 
For example, in 1976 the Supreme Court considered a patent on an 
automated system for using water to clean cow droppings from barns.35 The 
Court found the patent obvious as a simple use of water and automation. 
Prospect theory would justify upholding the patent because it would have 
enabled a manufacturer to invest in designing a marketable system and proving 
its value to America’s dairy farmers. Without the assurances of exclusivity 
granted by a patent, a manufacturer would be less likely to make investments 
in this socially beneficial system. Why invest in demonstrating the value of 
automated cleanup to dairy farmers without assurances that others could not 
sell cheaper versions of the same system once dairy farmers were sold on it?  
Prospect theory strongly supports the use of commercial success to 
demonstrate nonobviousness because it indicates that the patent serves as the 
“foundation for a series of now valuable contract rights” formed in reliance on 
its validity.36 Prospect theory accepts commercial success to prove patent 
validity for normative, reliance-based reasons, not because commercial success 
actually proves nonobviousness.37 Of course, prospect theory would still 
require a showing of nexus to prove that the patented invention itself—not 
 
33.  Kitch introduced this new theory in 1977, a decade after his landmark article on Graham. See 
Kitch, supra note 26.  
34.  Prospect theory has faced a number of criticisms. See, e.g., Roger L. Beck, The Prospect 
Theory of the Patent System and Unproductive Competition, 5 RES. L. & ECON . 193 (1983) 
(challenging Kitch’s assumptions that patents protect future developments); Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1043 (1989) (finding no support for the theory in judicial decisions); 
Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor After 
Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1353-57 (arguing that prospect theory has an unrealistic 
view of inventors as risk-averse and incorrectly assumes that commercialization furthers 
social good); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 868-76 (1990) (“The real problem is not controlling 
overfishing, but preventing underfishing after exclusive rights have been granted.”); Oddi, 
supra note 26, at 282 (arguing that the theory has had no success in predicting the outcome 
of individual patent cases). 
35.  Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976); see also Kitch, supra note 26, at 284 (discussing 
Sakraida). 
36.  Kitch, supra note 26, at 283; see also Oddi, supra note 26, at 281-82 (providing an overview of 
prospect theory). 
37.  See Merges, supra note 10, at 841 (“Kitch discards any worry about the inferential links 
between market success and patentability; the fact that the invention has commercial value 
means it is patentable.”). 
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extraneous factors—serves as the basis of the valuable contract rights. Some 
commentators have suggested that prospect theory provides the underpinnings 
for the expanded role of commercial success in the Federal Circuit’s 
jurisprudence.38 
C. Critiques of Commercial Success  
The convenience of commercial success for nontechnical fact-finders and its 
grounding in theory have led to its increased use, but it has also drawn 
significant scholarly criticism. In a 1966 article noting the four inferences39 
required to deduce nonobviousness from commercial success, Professor 
Edmund W. Kitch argues that each of these inferences could be quite weak.40 
Of course, courts have responded to the weakest of these inferences—that 
commercial success is due to the claimed invention—by requiring proof of 
nexus.41 Even here, however, Merges notes that the nexus requirement marked 
a significant softening from the earlier requirement that the proof of a link must 
be “positively clear . . . that the commercial success asserted was the direct result” 
of the invention.42 
Merges also reviews theoretical models and empirical studies of invention 
and innovation,43 finding that they undermine each of the four inferences 
between commercial success and nonobviousness.44 For example, firms act on 
incomplete information, with differing approaches to research and 
development (R&D) and varying levels of responsiveness to market demands.45 
Firms with entrenched products will not find certain innovations profitable, 
although other firms might.46 Competing researchers may proceed in different 
 
38.  See Rhodes, supra note 26, at 1094-95. Prospect theory also supports strong patent rights in 
general, Oddi, supra note 26, at 287, and commentators have found extensive evidence that 
the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence has significantly strengthened the rights of patentees. 
See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER , supra note 22, at 334-53. 
39.  See supra Subsection I.B.1. 
40.  See Kitch, supra note 16, at 332. 
41.  See supra text accompanying notes 29-31. 
42.  Merges, supra note 10, at 824 (quoting In re Heldt, 433 F.2d 808, 812 (C.C.P.A. 1970)); see 
also id. at 833 (“[T]he Federal Circuit’s nexus standard is hardly a model of clarity.”). 
43.  Invention is the actual technological step forward. Innovation is the process of bringing a 
working version of the invention to market. Id. at 807. 
44.  Id. at 852-60. 
45.  Id. at 852-55, 860. This undermines the second of the four inferences. 
46.  Id. at 855-56, 860 (citing Shelco v. Dow Chem. Co., 322 F. Supp. 485, 508 (N.D. Ill. 1970)). 
This undermines the third of the four inferences. Merges also notes that the first firm to 
invent (i.e., conceive of the solution) might not be the first to innovate (i.e., bring a 
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directions, driven by academic pressures rather than financial incentives.47 
Overall, most scholarly attention on commercial success has attacked its use, 
rather than addressing ways to improve its accuracy.48 The courts, however, 
continue to place great weight on commercial success,49 and it remains a 
heavily litigated issue.50 
ii. the current misguided use of revenue data  
Despite the growing importance of commercial success in patent cases, 
courts use the wrong metrics for proving it. The Federal Circuit’s 
jurisprudence clearly holds that commercial success is “usually shown by 
significant sales in a relevant market.”51 Sales, of course, equal revenues. Courts 
have also found other metrics related to revenue to be probative of commercial 
success, including market share (i.e., revenue divided by market size) and unit 
 
workable version of the invention to market). Id. at 860. This observation undermines the 
fourth inference. 
47.  Id. at 857-58 (citing Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 
1986)). Competitors without any profit motive completely upend the assumptions of 
commercial success. 
48.  Id.; see, e.g., Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives of Mickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries of 
Intellectual Property Law, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, ¶ 11 (2004), 
http://www.vjolt.net/vol9/issue2/v9i2_a04-Depoorter.pdf; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent 
Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON . REV. 1, 
25 (2004) (noting “the Federal Circuit’s practice of reserving its most outrageous 
[commercial success] overreaching for those cases where a certiorari petition is unlikely”); 
Mandel, supra note 12, at 1423-25 (arguing that empirical evidence shows that commercial 
success does not cure hindsight bias); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-
Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1111 (2003); Nathan 
Machin, Comment, Prospective Utility: A New Interpretation of the Utility Requirement of 
Section 101 of the Patent Act, 87 CAL. L. REV. 421, 446 (1999). 
49.  See, e.g., Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d. 1367, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 
1986) (noting that commercial success is not mere icing on the cake); Stratoflex, Inc. v. 
Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that a lower court’s failure to 
consider evidence of commercial success is reversible error). 
50.  See, e.g., Visto Corp. v. Smartner Info. Sys., No. 06-80339, No. 06-80352, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 8481, at *12-13 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2 007) (litigating discovery of commercial success 
information); Pfizer Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 271 (D.N.J. 2006). 
Following the lead of Learned Hand, Merges would weigh commercial success much less 
than failure of others. The actual failure of others goes much more directly to 
nonobviousness than does commercial success. Merges, supra note 10, at 862-66, 875. 
51.  J.T. Eaton & Co., Inc. v. Atl. Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(emphasis added); see also Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 
2006); Neupak, Inc. v. Ideal Mfg. & Sales Corp ., 41 F. App’x 435, 440 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Bose 
Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods. Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva 
Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 02-0512, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14724 (S.D. Ind. July 29, 2004). 
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sales (i.e., revenue divided by unit price).52 By contrast, when opinions do refer 
to profitability, they do so merely as an afterthought to revenue data.53 As a 
result, lower courts typically do not permit discovery of profit data even in 
cases centered on commercial success.54  
This Part begins by arguing that profits and not revenues should be the 
measure of commercial success. It then considers what role a lack of profits 
should have in the nonobviousness inquiry and concludes that a lack of profits 
should exclude any consideration of commercial success entirely. This 
conclusion has no value if patentees would never sue to enforce an unprofitable 
patent, so the Part explains why holders of unprofitable patents do indeed have 
incentives to bring suit. This Part finishes by suggesting possible explanations 
for how revenue became so entrenched in the case law.  
A. Profits Should Prove Commercial Success and Nonobviousness 
Current commercial success jurisprudence works from the flawed 
presumption that businesses aim to maximize revenue rather than profits. In 
many—but not all—cases, higher revenues will indeed result in higher profits 
for a firm, provided it can keep its costs sufficiently under control. As the two 
following hypothetical situations demonstrate, however, in a number of 
situations, measuring commercial success by revenue will lead to an incorrect 
conclusion about nonobviousness. 
1. Hypothetical: Lower Volume, Higher Price 
Assume that the mousetrap market is highly competitive, with several 
manufacturers, each selling three million mousetraps at one dollar apiece. With 
average costs of $0.90 per trap, each manufacturer makes a profit of $0.10 per 
 
52.  See, e.g., Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also Cable Elec. 
Prod., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1026-27 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (dismissing per-unit 
profitability data as irrelevant). 
53.  See, e.g., Hildebrand v. Steck Mfg. Co., 395 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1048 (D. Colo. 2005) (noting a 
“gross profits estimation of $416,000” and “total gross sales at $2,331,081.43”); Ortho-
McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Lab., Inc., 34 8 F. Supp. 2d 713, 756 (N.D. W. Va. 2004) 
(mentioning “$5 billion in sales and more than $1 billion in profit” before continuing to 
discuss sales trends). 
54.  See, e.g., Chubb Integrated Sys. Ltd. v. Nat’l Ba nk of Wash., 103 F.R.D. 52, 56-57 (D.D.C. 
1984) (refusing to compel answer to interrogatory question about profits because case law 
does not find profits probative of commercial success); see also Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. 
U.S. Philips Corp., No. 01 Civ. 5012, 2002 U.S.  Dist. LEXIS 18666, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 
2002) (noting that “profit margins or other indicia of profitability” are not discoverable in 
order to show commercial success). 
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trap. All manufacturers have long strived to develop a better mousetrap, which 
could sell in quantities of one million traps a year at two dollars apiece to those 
consumers who have serious rodent problems. 
Firm A’s engineers manage to develop the better mousetrap, which A 
patents. A determines it can maximize its profits by giving up building normal 
mousetraps and using its existing plant to build one million of these better 
mousetraps annually, and selling them at two dollars apiece. Production costs 
for the better mousetrap will remain $0.90 per trap.55 
As a result of its better mousetrap, A’s profits rise from three hundred 
thousand dollars per year56 to 1.1 million dollars per year,57 a nearly fourfold 
increase. At the same time, its revenues have dropped from three million 
dollars58 to two million dollars59 as A goes “upscale.” If one also assumes the 
total dollar size of the mousetrap market remains constant, A’s market share 
has also fallen by one-third.60 
A’s competitors knew about the potential for a better mousetrap and had a 
substantial profit incentive to develop it themselves, but failed. Courts should 
clearly infer nonobviousness from this situation. However, determining 
commercial success by revenues or market share would prevent this inference.  
2. Hypothetical: Lower Average Costs, Same Marginal Costs 
Now consider the widget market and assume that it is also highly 
competitive, with all widget manufacturers using effectively the same 
manufacturing process. Widgets sell for one dollar apiece, with a breakdown of 
$0.50 for electricity, $0.40 for other costs, and $0.10 of profit. Each 
manufacturer sells one million widgets annually and maximizes its profits by 
running its machinery eight hours a day. 
Industry engineers had long known that it was theoretically possible to 
reuse the condensation generated by one day’s manufacturing to power the 
first four hours of manufacturing the next day. Widget manufacturer X’s 
engineers finally perfect this environmentally friendly process and patent it. 
 
55.  This is a very reasonable assumption. Although there will be fewer units for spreading fixed 
costs, marginal costs tend to decrease at lower levels of production due to less overtime, less 
use of electricity at peak-rate periods, etc. 
56.  Three million mousetraps times $0.10 profit per mousetrap. 
57.  A price of two dollars with average costs of $0.90 yields $1.10 in profits per unit. Multiply 
this profit by one million mousetraps produced annually. 
58.  Three million mousetraps at a price of one dollar per mousetrap.  
59.  One million mousetraps at a price of two dollars per mousetrap. 
60.  Three million dollars to two million dollars is a one-third drop. 
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Prior to this, X and all other widget manufacturers spent five hundred 
thousand dollars a year on electricity.61 Using the patented process to avoid 
using electricity for four hours a day saves X two hundred fifty thousand 
dollars annually on electricity.62 
Why doesn’t X expand its hours of operation now that it has this process? 
Because all businesses maximize profit by producing until the marginal cost of 
each additional unit equals the marginal revenue. The new process only saves 
electricity on the first four hours of operation, so the marginal cost to X of 
expanding production from eight hours to nine hours does not change,63 and X 
will keep production at eight hours to maximize profits.  
With this new process, X’s profits increase from one hundred thousand 
dollars64 to three hundred fifty thousand dollars,65 but its revenues remain 
constant at one million dollars. Again, although courts should infer 
nonobviousness, basing commercial success on revenue prevents this 
inference.66 
B. Lack of Profits Should Exclude Considerations of Commercial Success 
The previous Section argued that courts should consider profitability as 
proof of nonobviousness. The logical converse does not follow. Specifically, a 
lack of profits does not tend to prove obviousness. The Federal Circuit has 
properly held that lack of commercial success should not weigh toward 
 
61.  Fifty cents of electricity per unit times one million units per year. 
62.  Four hours is half of the eight hours that the machines are run, so the savings are half of five 
hundred dollars. 
63.  For example, beyond eight hours the firm might have to pay overtime to its workers or 
nuisance compensation to residential neighbors who dislike manufacturing noise outside 
business hours. Or, perhaps expanding production beyond one million units would involve 
going onto a relatively expensive spot market to buy certain inputs, whereas the first one 
million units are covered by a long-term contract at a good price. 
64.  Ten cents times one million units. 
65.  One hundred thousand dollars plus two hundred fifty thousand dollars in electricity 
savings. 
66.  Of course, X could license its patent to other widget manufacturers for a royalty between 
zero and two hundred fifty thousand dollars annually, but licensing is counted as a 
secondary consideration separate from commercial success, which is the weightiest 
secondary consideration. See Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson 
Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1992). But see EWP Corp. v. Reliance 
Universal Inc., 755 F.2d 898, 907-08 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See generally 2 CHISUM, supra note 15, 
§ 5.05[3] (discussing licensing as a secondary consideration). Moreover, if the widget 
industry had some barriers to expanded production, the industry as a whole might still not 
experience revenue growth for quite some time. 
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obviousness.67 This holding applies regardless of whether revenues or profits 
prove commercial success. 
Deducing obviousness from commercial failure requires two extremely 
troublesome inferences.68 First, one must infer that the commercial failure 
results from the invention’s lack of potential. This inference is unreasonable, as 
few patented inventions are immediately successful; rather, most require 
extensive development to reach full marketability.69 
Second, one must infer that if no one else skilled in the field attempted to 
develop the invention, the patentee succeeded because of the invention’s 
obviousness. This inference is also very weak. Indeed, the most nonobvious 
patents sometimes emerge from areas no one else was considering because the 
patent-holder was years ahead of the rest of the field. Pioneering patents often 
result in commercial failure70 because they depend on other technologies that 
have either not yet matured or are prohibitively expensive.71 
Lack of profits does, however, have a proper role in showing lack of 
commercial success and lack of a nexus between the invention and purported 
commercial success.72 In other words, a lack of profits should be a completely 
neutral factor, acting only to remove any consideration of commercial success 
 
67.  Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting 
Medtronic Inc. v. Intermedics, Inc., 799 F.2d 734, 739 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“[T]he absence 
of objective evidence is a neutral factor.”)). See generally 2 CHISUM, supra note 15, 
§ 5.05[2][h]. 
68.  Recall that inferring nonobviousness from commercial success requires four potentially 
shaky inferences. See Kitch, supra note 16, at 332; see also supra Subsection I.B.1. To 
investigate whether the reverse of the inference makes sense, we must consider the logical 
negatives of the four inferences identified by Kitch. These logical negatives are: (1) the 
commercial failure is due to the invention’s lack of commercial potential; (2) if an 
improvement has in fact become a commercial failure, it is likely that this potential failure 
was perceived before its development; (3) the potential commercial failure having been 
perceived, it is likely that no efforts were made to develop the improvement; and (4) no 
efforts having been made by others skilled in the field, the patentee succeeded because of the 
invention’s obviousness. Inferences (1) and (4) are extremely problematic, for the reasons 
discussed in the main text. 
69.  See CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int’l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
70.  Commercial failure typically implies lack of either revenues or profits.  
71.  See EDITH TILTON PENROSE , THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 30-31 
(1951); Oddi, supra note 26, at 275. 
72.  For more on the potential inferences from lack of profitability, see Richard L. Robbins, 
Note, Subtests of “Nonobviousness”: A Nontechnical Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1169, 1177 (1964). Robbins argues that commercial failure at least rebuts any possible 
inference of “long-felt need,” another of the “secondary considerations” mentioned in 
Graham and heavily employed by the Federal Circuit. Lack of profits could similarly be used 
to rebut “failure of others,” also listed as a secondary consideration in Graham. Graham v. 
John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).  
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from the case. The fact-finder should evaluate an unprofitable patent’s 
nonobviousness upon its technical or scientific merits, as well as the other 
secondary considerations, without any commercial success data. Removing 
commercial success from consideration due to the absence of profits does not 
require the two extremely troublesome inferences noted above. Moreover, this 
limited conclusion makes sense under both prospect theory and the classical 
theory.73 
1. Classical Theory Sees No Success, No Nexus, and Negated Inferences 
The classical theory dictates that a lack of profits should remove any 
consideration of commercial success for three reasons. First, in the business 
world, commercial success is profitability, not revenues. In other words, a 
court should not properly even find commercial success in the absence of 
profits. 
Second, a lack of profitability severs the nexus that the case law requires 
between alleged commercial success and the patented invention.74 Courts have 
found a number of possible factors to sever this nexus, including advertising,75 
dominant market position,76 and superior workmanship.77 Consider a product 
that experiences commercial success as currently defined—substantial 
revenues—but loses money. The patentee has thus charged less than the cost of 
production. This unprofitable underpricing provides an alternative explanation 
for the substantial revenues, at least as authoritative as good advertising or 
superior workmanship.  
 
73.  In some circumstances, an unforeseeable event will significantly reduce revenues or increase 
costs for a previously profitable product. In these cases, a court might decide to allow the 
patentee to submit evidence that but for the event, it would have been profitable. The 
standard of proof for accepting such evidence, however, should be substantially higher than 
the “preponderance of the evidence” used to show nonobviousness. “Clear and convincing 
evidence” suggests itself as a possibility. The court should also consider whether the product 
would have been profitable if the costs of proper hedging and insurance were factored in. 
74.  This is the first of the four inferences mentioned in Subsection I.B.1. 
75.  McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. L. Perrigo Co., 337 F.3d  1362, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[Patentee] 
launched a massive marketing and advertising campaign in connection with the launch of 
[the product], obscuring any nexus that might have existed between the merits of the 
product and its commercial success.”). 
76.  Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 444 F.2d 295, 300 (9th Cir. 1970) 
(recognizing market position as a secondary consideration). 
77.  Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing, Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1393 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
profits as commercial success 
659 
 
Third, recall from Subsection I.B.1 that deducing nonobviousness from 
commercial success requires four separate inferences.78 The third inference is 
that “the potential commercial success having been perceived, it is likely that 
efforts were made to develop the improvement.”79 As discussed above, profits, 
not revenues, motivate business choices, including efforts to develop an 
improvement. If an invention turns out to be unprofitable then the likelihood 
increases that others perceived the unprofitability and did not invest in 
developing improvements increases. Any inference of nonobviousness is hence 
improper. 
Although it seems completely intuitive that the absence of profits should 
negate any showing of nonobviousness through commercial success, no case 
law has established this proposition. This disparity came to the forefront in a 
recent unpublished Federal Circuit opinion, Medpointe Healthcare, Inc. v. Hi-
Tech Pharmacal Co.80 The two-judge majority found it self-evident that a 
patent’s lack of profitability negated any showing of commercial success.81 
Chief Judge Mayer vehemently dissented, writing, “I have been unable to find 
any case that suggests that a product was commercially unsuccessful because it 
had only broken even at the time of inquiry.”82 
2. Prospect Theory Sees Worthless “Contract Rights” 
Bear in mind that prospect theory would lead courts to place great weight 
on commercial success because it indicates that the patent forms the 
“foundation for a series of now valuable contract rights.”83 The value of a 
contract right to its holder and to the economy depends on its profitability. A 
patent that generates no profits serves as the basis for contract rights that 
 
78.  The four required inferences were: (1) the commercial success is due to the innovation (i.e., 
the existence of nexus); (2) if an improvement has in fact become commercially successful, it 
is likely that this potential commercial success was perceived before its development; (3) the 
potential commercial success having been perceived, it is likely that efforts were made to 
develop the improvement; (4) efforts having been made by [persons skilled in the field], 
they failed because the patentee was the first to reduce his development to practice. Kitch, 
supra note 16, at 332. 
79.  Id. 
80.  115 F. App’x 76 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
81.  Id. at 80. 
82.  Id. at 82 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting). 
83.  Kitch, supra note 26, at 283; see also supra Subsection I.B.2. 
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generate no societal surplus,84 removing the prospect theory-based argument 
for upholding the patent. 
To employ prospect theory’s analogy, consider a plot of land under which 
the lessee has discovered gold. For each of the twenty years of the lease, the 
lessee expects to extract one million dollars worth of gold, at the cost of one 
million dollars in labor, equipment, and pollution-control. The lessee’s 
activities generate zero benefit to the lessee or to society. Hence, society would 
be no worse off if the government simply canceled the lease.85 The same 
reasoning applies to unprofitable patent rights. 
C. Why Sue To Enforce an Unprofitable Patent? 
The previous Section reached an actionable conclusion for courts: exclude 
any consideration of commercial success for an unprofitable patent. For this 
conclusion to have any value, this Note  must show that patentees would sue to 
enforce an unprofitable patent in the first place. Patent law provides for 
damages typically equal to profits lost by the patentee because of the 
infringement.86 On its face, this seems to make the issue of how to handle 
unprofitable patents moot. If a patent proved unprofitable for its owner, then 
its infringement would yield zero damages, discouraging patent litigation in 
the first place. A closer look at damages calculations and other available 
remedies, however, shows that holders of unprofitable patents often will have 
strong incentives to sue infringers. 
In assessing damages for patent infringement, profits generally mean 
marginal profits that would have accrued from producing the additional 
 
84.  Of course, a patent may have significant positive externalities on society that the patentee 
does not capture. For example, a patent might indicate a broad new set of approaches to 
addressing an old problem. These externalities, however, do not bear on the value of the 
contract rights founded on the patent. 
85.  There may be transaction costs involved with returning the labor and capital to other uses. 
In the patent context, however, the transaction costs involved with simply enforcing a 
patent are usually very high. Raymond Van Dyke, Functional Economics: The New Language 
in Computing Lost Profits, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 195, 215 n.115 (2006) (citing AIPLA REPORT OF THE 
ECONOMIC SURVEY 2005, at 22 (2005)) (observing that the typical cost of “litigation fees” for 
a simple patent case is three hundred fifty thousand dollars, and complicated, higher-
damages cases range from six hundred fifty thousand dollars to 4.5 million dollars, typically 
costing three million dollars). The savings from avoiding additional patent enforcement 
might well outweigh the transaction costs of reallocating the labor and capital tied to an 
invalidated patent. 
86.  The other two possible measures of damages are established royalties and hypothetical 
royalties. See generally 7 CHISUM, supra note 15, § 20.03 (2002 & Supp. 2005) (describing the 
three measures of damages for patent infringement).  
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units.87 Courts ignore fixed costs in profitability determinations.88 This choice 
makes sense in that it awards to the plaintiff the money it would have made but 
for the defendant’s infringement. For example, it means that a patentee with an 
unprofitable product with high fixed costs but low marginal costs could 
recover damages of nearly its full sale price per lost unit in damages. Suing to 
enforce unprofitable patents can thus net substantial sums of money.  
Consider the following hypothetical involving a software program to 
manage the manufacture of widgets. Both companies A and B develop software 
for widget makers, and both recognize the potential for a new software process 
to run it. Company B talks to some of its customers and realizes that the 
process is an obvious next step and that many widget makers will want their 
in-house engineers to develop the software. In contrast, A does not talk to its 
customers, and hence does not realize the obviousness of the process. A then 
patents the process,89 and invests one million dollars in developing the 
software based on it. 
However, A sells only fifty installations at ten thousand dollars per 
installation for total revenues of five hundred thousand dollars. For each 
installation sold, A has an average loss of five thousand dollars but a marginal 
profit of ten thousand dollars, since it costs nothing to create another copy of an 
already-written software program.90 If A successfully sues a group of widget-
makers who developed their own version, it will get damages of ten thousand 
dollars per lost installation. Incidentally, if A also wins a permanent injunction 
against the widget-makers, it could threaten temporarily to shut down the 
defendants’ operations, extracting substantially more.91 A widget-maker would 
be willing to pay up to its full expected profits to buy off an injunction that 
 
87.  Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 22 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(“The incremental income approach to the computation of lost profits is well established in 
the law relating to patent damages.”); see also 7 CHISUM, supra note 15, § 20.03[1][d][ii] 
(2002 & Supp. 2005). Judge Easterbrook, known for his strong law and economics 
reasoning, has realized that this simplifies matters too much. In one case, he based damages 
on the shape of the demand curve. In re Mahurkar Double Luman Hemodialysis Catheter 
Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp. 1354, 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1993).  
88.  Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d at 22. 
89.  The PTO often issues patents on inventions that later litigation determines are obvious. See 
Allison & Lemley, supra note 3. 
90.  Concededly, this hypothetical is somewhat simplified because additional installations would 
likely involve some marginal costs, such as sales commissions, product manuals, and 
support. 
91.  See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (holding that courts should 
not issue permanent injunctions against infringers as a matter of right, but only if the 
traditional four-factor equity test for permanent injunctions dictates an injunction). Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence remarked that the threat of an injunction “can be employed as a 
bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees.” Id. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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otherwise might shut down production while its engineers retool to work 
around the patent.  
Using marginal profits to measure damages gives patentees an especially 
strong incentive to sue to enforce unprofitable patents in industries with low 
marginal costs. These industries include software and pharmaceuticals. 
Disturbingly, Company A in the hypothetical above could have intended this 
result all along, knowing that the patent was likely obvious but planning on 
using it to push its software on widget-makers.92 Alternatively, A could have 
had mixed motives, hoping to produce a profit without resorting to threats of 
patent litigation, but keeping it as a backup option. 
Other factors also increase the value of suing for damages on an 
unprofitable patent. First, any reasonable doubt in the measure of damages is 
resolved in favor of the plaintiff.93 Second, defendants’ trial counsel cannot 
make too much of their case against large damages awards without appearing 
to the jury to admit to the infringement in the first place.94 Third, 35 U.S.C. 
§ 284 expressly provides that damages shall “in no event [be] less than a 
reasonable royalty . . . .”95 This section provides an alternative measure of 
damages that acts as a minimum floor, ensuring that patentees have incentives 
to sue on many otherwise unprofitable patents.  
D. Origins of Commercial Success as Revenues 
Given the wide acceptance that profits, and not revenues, motivate business 
decisions,96 why did jurisprudence come to rely upon revenues? No published 
opinion known to the author actually explains the decision to use revenues 
instead of profits, and the judges who first interpreted Graham are no longer 
available to explain their reasoning, making any answers necessarily 
speculative. One possibility is that many judges come from private practice, 
where partner compensation has increasingly been determined by revenue 
 
92.  Company B in the hypothetical above might have also recognized this possibility but 
decided against it because of scruples or fear of alienating widget makers who bought 
another of its products. 
93.  See Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 926 F.2d 1136, 1141 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Any doubts 
regarding the calculatory precision of the damage amount must be resolved against the 
infringer.”). 
94.  Juries often act in a seemingly irrational manner when awarding damages in patent cases. 
See, e.g., Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (finding that a $5.93 million award was not “speculative” despite the fact that “neither 
party can ascertain exactly how it was calculated”).  
95.  35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). 
96.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER , ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10 (6th ed. 2003). 
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generation.97 It is also possible that the judges who first introduced revenue as 
the primary measure were not schooled in law and economics. Indeed, Graham 
came down in 1966 as the law and economics movement was in its nascence.98  
An intriguing alternative explanation is that American businesses paid 
more attention to revenues forty years ago than they do now. In 1959, seven 
years before Graham, economist William J. Baumol put forth the “Revenue 
Maximization Hypothesis.”99 He posited that structural and incentive factors, 
such as a distaste for laying off employees,100 made many executives focus on 
increasing revenues once they had achieved a minimum acceptable profit 
level.101 Baumol wrote, “Surely it is common experience that, when one asks an 
executive, ‘How’s business?’, he will answer that his sales have been increasing 
(or decreasing), and talk about his profit only as an afterthought, if at all.”102 
This answer could easily have come from the published opinions of many 
federal judges. When asked, “How commercially successful is this patentee?” 
judges write of increasing or decreasing sales, with profits only mentioned as 
an afterthought, if at all.103  
Starting in the 1930s, the profit-maximizing incentives of the managers of 
publicly traded corporations weakened “as corporations had become larger, 
management ownership had shrunk and shareholders had become more widely 
dispersed.”104 This trend reversed in the 1980s and 1990s, with a number of 
changes in corporate governance, including the use of hostile takeovers to 
remove underperforming managers,105 the rise of shareholder activism,106 and, 
above all, the increase in incentive-based CEO compensation such as stock 
 
97.  See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Taking Law Firms Seriously, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155, 157 
(2002). One could object that the “eat what you kill” system had not yet become the 
dominant model by the 1960s, but revenue concerns had always been on the minds of law 
firm partners. The current focus of law firms on revenue is unmistakable, and certainly 
helps explain the continued vitality of revenues in commercial success jurisprudence.  
98.  As just one of many possible examples, Richard Posner published the first edition of his first 
book, Economic Analysis of Law, fully seven years after Graham. See RICHARD A. POSNER , 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1st ed. 1972). 
99.  WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH 45-53 (1959).  
100.  Id. at 46. 
101.  Id. at 49.  
102.  Id. at 47.  
103.  See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.  
104.  See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the 
United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, J. ECON . PERSP., Spring 2001, at 121, 129 
(discussing several works by Michael C. Jensen).  
105.  See id. 
106.  Id. at 134-35.  
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options.107 The press lionizes managers, like former General Electric CEO Jack 
Welch, who excel at maximizing their company’s expected profit streams, as 
reflected in their stock price.108 Corporate law around the world is increasingly 
moving toward putting profits and shareholders first.109 Whatever one’s 
ideological take on corporations’ current relentless focus on earnings and stock 
prices, few would think their managers’ version of commercial success is 
revenue.  
Publicly traded corporations, of course, do not commercialize all patents. 
Venture capital has exploded since Graham from virtually nothing110 to raising 
new capital at an annualized rate of twenty-nine billion dollars per year as of 
this writing,111 while financing the commercialization of an increasing portion 
of U.S. innovation.112 Venture capital funds are structured to provide very 
strong incentives for their managers to focus on profitability, typically paying 
 
107.  Id. at 133.  
108.  See, e.g., The Revolutionary Spirit, ECONOMIST , Sept. 18, 1999, at 17, 17 (praising General 
Electric’s then-CEO Jack Welch, under whom the company’s share price rose “thirtyfold”).  
109.  See, e.g., id. (“If the past decade has had a single theme, it has been the transformation of 
American capitalism. This is seen not just in record profits at American firms . . . it is more 
visible still in companies around the world falling over themselves to ape the American way 
. . . . Michelin, once the epitome of the French, state-supported way, has caused outrage by 
proposing to cut its workforce even when profits are healthy.”). This is relevant because 
roughly half of all patents issued by the U.S. PTO have listed inventors residing outside the 
United States. See PTO, Patent Counts by Country/State and Year (2007), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/cst_utl.pdf (noting that 83,948 of the 173,771 patents issued in 
2006 listed nonresident inventors); see also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End 
of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001) (arguing that most countries’ corporate 
law will converge toward a “standard model” of U.S.-style shareholder control). Hansmann 
and Kraakman do not even consider America to have been shareholder-centric in the 1950s 
and 1960s, being “manager-oriented” rather than shareholder-oriented. Id. at 443-44.  
110.  See PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER , THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 1 (2d ed. 2004) 
(describing annual inflows at virtually zero in the mid-1970s, nearly a decade after Graham).  
111.  See Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n & Thomson Fin., Venture Capital 
Fundraising Activity Healthy and Prudent in Second Quarter of 2007 (July 16, 2007), 
available at http://www.nvca.org/pdf/Q207VCFundraisingfinal.pdf (reporting $7.2 billion 
in the second quarter of 2007, which annualizes to a rate of $28.8 billion). Of course, inflows 
were considerably higher at the peak of the dot-com boom in 2000. GOMPERS & LERNER , 
supra note 110, at 1 (reporting inflows of $105 billion in 2000).  
112.  See GOMPERS & LERNER , supra note 110, at 306 (estimating that by 1998, “venture funding 
accounted for about fourteen percent of U.S. innovative activity,” and finding that venture 
capital has had a significant positive impact on patenting); see also Holmstrom & Kaplan, 
supra note 104, at 136-37 (locating increasing use of venture capital in a trend of 
decentralization in the U.S. economy); William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of 
Venture-Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN . ECON . 473, 482 (1990) (listing some notable venture 
capital-backed successes).  
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managers twenty percent of the fund’s profits.113 Fund managers keep close 
control over the ventures they finance, maximizing long-term profit streams, 
which determine the price the venture will fetch upon resale or public stock 
offering.114 This incentive scheme leads venture capital funds, like CEOs, to 
keep a strong focus on profits, a focus that judges should recognize by moving 
toward using profits as the measure of commercial success.  
iii. implementing profits as commercial success  
Profits equal revenues minus costs. This relationship highlights two 
potential drawbacks to using profits instead of revenues to prove or disprove 
commercial success. First, determining profitability requires calculating costs, 
which requires additional calculation. Second, since costs—like revenues—can 
be manipulated, additional potential for “fuzzy numbers” enters the picture. 
Neither of these two drawbacks should  prevent using profits instead of 
revenues. Courts have significant experience in determining profits in many 
other situations, including assessing patent damages.115 Corporate scandals 
such as Xerox’s have shown the extreme susceptibility of revenue to 
manipulation.116 Moreover, companies typically already retain the appropriate 
profitability records for other purposes. 
This Part considers the practical aspects of having courts use profits rather 
than revenue to determine commercial success. It first details how courts 
should measure profits in the simplest case, where the firm in question markets 
only the patented invention. It then looks at how the accounting extends to the 
more complex situation where the patentee has multiple products. It then 
argues that the changes from revenues to profits would not create more work 
for courts and could even increase judicial efficiency. The Part concludes by 
noting that using profits does not create any perverse incentives. 
A. Simplest Case: Firm Only Markets the Patented Invention 
In the simplest case, a court must determine the profitability of a patentee 
who sells only products embodying the patented invention. Looking at the 
 
113.  GOMPERS & LERNER , supra note 110, at 91; Sahlman, supra note 112, at 491.  
114.  See Sahlman, supra note 112, at 506-10.  
115.  Of course, courts recognize the fact that economic profits—the ideal to be used under either 
classical or prospect theory—often differ widely from accounting profits. See, e.g., Telerate 
Sys., Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
116.  See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Xerox Corp., No. 02-272789 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2002), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/complr17465.htm (detailing how Xerox 
manipulated its revenues). 
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measures of profitability in this case will help clarify what measures to use in 
more complicated situations. Issues to consider include the appropriate 
timeframe, whether to include development costs, how to handle 
nondeveloped fixed costs, and what the benchmark should be.  
First, over what timeframe should courts look to determine profitability? 
Many cases dealing with commercial success as revenue focus on annual 
numbers in the latest available year.117 This timeframe makes sense for a 
number of reasons: it provides a large sample size, seasonal variations cancel 
out over the course of a year, and financial and tax reporting numbers are 
audited every year. Alternatively, courts could look to the entire lifetime of the 
invention, from the firm’s decision to pursue developing it through the 
present. Which makes the most sense? 
Lack of profitability over an annual period should definitely negate any 
inference of commercial success from high revenue numbers or market share 
over the same year. As demonstrated in Subsection II.B.1, a lack of profitability 
severs the nexus between the merits of the invention and any other indicators 
of commercial success. Unprofitability indicates that the revenue or market 
share numbers resulted from setting the price to an unprofitable and hence 
unsustainable amount. This inference holds true over any discrete time period, 
whether a year, quarter, or decade. 
Classical theory and prospect theory differ on what timeframe a patentee 
must look at affirmatively to prove commercial success. Classical theory, with its 
focus on inducing rational agents to invent, would require a patentee to show 
profitability in net present value over the entire period from the start of 
development through the present.118 Recall that inferring nonobviousness from 
commercial success requires an inference that the potential of the invention 
drew others to attempt to develop the invention. Economic theory predicts that 
firms make decisions based on the net present value of that decision. Looking 
 
117.  See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (annual 
sales of one hundred million dollars); Richardson-Vicks Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 122 F.3d 1476, 
1482 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (annual sales of forty-eight million dollars); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Generix 
Drug Sales, Inc., 460 F.2d 1096, 1099 (5th Cir. 1972) (current annual rate of sales exceeding 
sixty-five million dollars). Many other cases focus on lifetime sales. See, e.g., Symbol Techs., 
Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (one hundred and fifty million 
dollars of total sales); Black & Decker Mfg. Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 679 F.2d 1101, 1104 
(4th Cir. 1982) (total sales volume of approximately one hundred and sixty-two million 
dollars); Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Sweetheart Plastics, Inc., 436 F.2d 1180, 1187 (7th Cir. 1971) 
(several billion cups sold). 
118.  Ideally, a court could determine the full measure of profits generated from the patented 
invention, but that would involve forecasting the future, a pursuit for which courts are badly 
suited. 
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back to the start of development should not pose a huge evidentiary problem, 
since patents only last twenty years from the application date. 
Prospect theory would allow a patentee to show profitability over a much 
shorter timeframe, such as a year. This timeframe would best approximate the 
current value of the contract rights founded upon the validity of the patent, the 
same contract rights that prospect theory uses to justify using commercial 
success in the first place.119 Whether a court decides to adopt a lifetime or 
annual approach should depend on whether it prefers the prospect or classical 
theory, as well as evidentiary availability and judicial economy. 
Second, courts should definitely include all of the costs of developing the 
patented invention into a marketable product. To see why, consider the absurd 
results if they did not: patents in industries with high development costs and 
low marginal costs would always appear profitable. This standard would find 
virtually all software and pharmaceutical patents nonobvious because much of 
the cost of products in those industries lies in their development. 
If a court decided to use annual profit numbers, it would have to allocate 
some portion of the development costs to that year. The logical accounting 
approach is to amortize the development costs across the life of the patent, 
allocating a portion of the up-front development costs to each later year during 
which the patentee actually benefits from its investment. Both international 
accounting standards120 and U.S. tax accounting121 actually require this 
treatment of development costs and could provide a starting point. 
Third, it goes without saying that variable costs should factor into the 
profitability decision. Whether to include nondevelopment fixed costs, such as 
the machines used to manufacture the patented widgets or the salaries of 
widget engineers, presents a harder question. Classical theory would simply 
count these toward the overall profitability of the invention, since such costs 
would have factored into the decisions of others to attempt to develop the 
patent. 
Prospect theory, which supports the use of commercial success because it 
indicates valuable contract rights founded on the patent, would also count 
fixed costs. Fixed costs virtually always involve contract rights, either explicitly 
 
119.  See supra Subsection I.B.2 (discussing why prospect theory leads to the conclusion of 
commercial success being relevant). 
120.  International Accounting Standard 38 permits amortization of development costs if certain 
criteria are met. International Accounting Standard Committee, International Accounting 
Standard 38 (1998), reprinted in 2003 O.J. (L 261) 258, 336-60, available at http://eur-lex 
.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2003/l_261/l_26120031013en02580385.pdf; see also Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu, IAS Plus International Accounting Standards IAS 38, Intangible Assets, 
http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ias38.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2007). 
121.  See 26 U.S.C. § 263A (2000). 
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or implicitly, and hence factor into the value of the overall contract rights 
founded on the patent. For example, a capital lease or loan taken out to 
purchase widget-manufacturing equipment factors explicitly into the current 
value of the contract rights. Alternatively, any owner’s equity that went into 
purchasing widget-manufacturing equipment involves an implicit contract 
whereby the firm intends to earn a return on that investment. 
Finally, the bar for finding profitability should not be zero. Instead, it 
should be the typical returns in the relevant industry for comparable projects.122 
For example, consider an oil refining company that patented an improved 
refining process at the same time that the demand for refined oil products 
skyrocketed, boosting the profits of all refineries. The proper test for whether 
the refining process was a commercial success should be neither zero nor the 
average cost of capital. Rather, it should be the average level of profitability 
within the industry. 
B. Multiple Products 
The accounting becomes more complicated when the patent in question 
does not cover all of a firm’s products or services. The question arises of how to 
allocate fixed costs. For example, consider a firm that produces product X, 
covered by the patent in question, and product Y, not covered by the patent. 
The firm manufactures both X and Y in the same factory on many of the same 
machines. How should a court allocate the cost of the factory, the machines, 
and the maintenance of those machines between products X and Y?  
A whole field of accounting—cost accounting—addresses this very issue. 
These issues of allocation are fundamental to financial reporting, tax 
accounting,123 and the internal accounting that supports management 
decisions. As a result, a firm must have already prepared these numbers in 
preparing its financial statements,124 determining its taxes, and making 
production decisions. For the first two purposes, these numbers conform to 
relevant rules and are audited. For the third purpose, of supporting 
management decisions, a firm with inaccurate cost allocation would make 
 
122.  Effectively, this results in a measurement of whether there is a profit from an economic 
point of view, which would deduct the opportunity cost of the invested capital.  
123.  See 26 U.S.C. § 263A (2000) (uniform capitalization rules). See generally DAVID H. 
MARSHALL, WAYNE M. MCMANUS & DANIEL F. VIELE, ACCOUNTING  484-526 (7th ed. 2005) 
(discussing cost accounting). 
124.  Even nonpublic companies must generally produce audited financial statements. For 
example, firms receiving venture capital must provide audited financial statements to their 
investors. Similarly, firms seeking debt financing from banks or the bond market generally 
must also provide audited financial statements. See MARSHALL ET AL., supra note 123, at 18. 
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improper decisions about production volume, price, or a whole range of other 
business variables.125 
C. Factors Mitigating the Impact on Judicial Economy 
The two measures of damages used in the majority of patent infringement 
cases—“lost profits” and “reasonable royalty”—require courts to calculate 
profit figures.126 As a result, a court that calculates profit numbers once in 
determining the presence or absence of commercial success could save time at a 
later stage of the litigation. These savings further mitigate any additional 
judicial burden from using profits in place of revenues. 
The “lost profits” measure of damages involves calculation of the cost 
structure of the relevant product. A court would have already investigated this 
in determining profitability for commercial success. When the patentee or 
infringer produces multiple products, courts have to determine issues of cost 
allocation.127 A court that had already determined profitability for purposes of 
commercial success would have already investigated and determined how to 
allocate costs. 
The “reasonable royalty” measure of damages requires the court to consider 
the fifteen factors described in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp.128 No 
 
125.  It is always possible that a firm fudged these numbers in anticipation of patent litigation 
where commercial success might play a role. Financial reporting and tax reporting rules, 
however, put constraints on manipulation. Additionally, if the firm manipulated its internal 
management cost accounting numbers, its management decisions would seem irrational. 
For example, if the firm in the example above consistently attempted to allocate an undue 
share of the costs to the unpatented product Y, which presumably faces normal market 
pressures, then Y would likely consistently have returns below the firm’s cost of capital. This 
situation would make the firm’s decision to keep producing Y very suspect, which could 
indicate the need for an adjustment of cost away from Y toward X for the purposes of the 
litigation. 
126.  See 7 CHISUM, supra note 15, § 20.03 (2002 & Supp. 2005) (discussing monetary relief). 
Courts sometimes use a third measure of damages, “established royalty,” which does not 
involve a court investigation into profitability. See id. § 20.03[2] (discussing established 
royalty damages). An unscientific review of Federal Circuit cases in LexisNexis finds 217 
mentions of “lost profits” and 205 mentions of “reasonable royalty,” as compared with only 
36 mentions of “established royalty.” This suggests that a solid majority of patent cases 
involve one of the two measures of damages that do require a computation of profitability. 
127.  Velo-Bind, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 647 F.2d 965, 973 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[D]amages 
are limited to that part of the profits, which must be apportioned as between those created 
by the patent and those not so created . . . .”); see also Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Corp., 
283 U.S. 27 (1931) (denying damages based on profits lost from sale of unpatented product 
related to patented product). 
128.  318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified and aff’d sub nom. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. 
U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971); see also Rite-Hite Corp. 
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fewer than four of these fifteen factors involve the existence or degree of overall 
profitability.129 Unlike the “lost profits” measure, which generally only requires 
an understanding of marginal profits,130 all four of these imply an 
understanding of overall profitability, taking into account total fixed and 
variable costs. Total profits are taken into account regardless of whether the 
patentee or infringer achieved the profits in question.131 
Furthermore, a court lacking the expertise to determine profitability could 
easily delegate this task to a special master. The Federal Rules of Civil 
 
v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (citing Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. 
Supp. at 1116). 
129.  The four Georgia-Pacific factors involving profits include the following:  
8. The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its 
commercial success; and its current popularity. 
. . . . 
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the 
particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the 
invention or analogous inventions. 
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as 
distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business 
risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer. 
. . . . 
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the 
infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both 
had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the 
amount which a prudent licensee—who desired, as a business proposition, to 
obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the 
patented invention—would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able 
to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been acceptable by a 
prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license.  
  Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120 (emphasis added). All four factors imply an 
understanding of overall profits to be reaped from the patented invention. For example, 
with relation to factor fifteen, no licensee would pay anything to license a patent when the 
fixed and variable costs of usage exceeded the revenues it could bring in. 
 Factor eight appears to contemplate precisely the same measure of profitability that this 
Note argues should apply to commercial succ ess, including development costs. Factors 
twelve, thirteen, and fifteen seem to contemplate the potential profitability once the patentee 
has fully developed the invention up to the point that it is ready for licensing. 
130.  For more detailed analysis, see Judge Easterbrook’s discussion of lost profits in In re 
Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litigation, 831 F. Supp. 1354, 1383-94 
(N.D. Ill. 1993). 
131.  See Trell v. Marlee Elecs. Corp., 912 F.2d 1443, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1990). In Trell, the Federal 
Circuit noted that “[i]n determining the result of such a hypothetical negotiation, the 
district court may consider the infringer’s anticipated profits, as indicated by evidence of 
actual profits.” Id. (emphasis added). This wording implies overall profitability, including 
fixed and variable costs. 
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Procedure explicitly contemplate submitting accounting questions to special 
masters, and extensive case law arising from a variety of substantive areas of 
law has clarified many aspects of this procedure.132 District courts dealing with 
patent suits have long submitted accounting issues regarding damages to 
special masters.133 Indeed, courts have also delegated a number of technical 
patent issues134 to special masters, suggesting that district courts feel quite 
comfortable doing so.  
D. Judicial Economies, Including Requiring a Threshold Profitability Showing  
This Note concluded in Section II.B that a lack of profits negates any 
possible inference of commercial success. Judges could turn this conclusion 
into a time-saving evidentiary requirement that a patentee must make a 
preliminary showing of profitability before considering any commercial success 
or nexus-related discovery, motions, or evidence admission. Putting this 
burden on the patentee makes sense, as the patentee typically will have the 
easiest access to the relevant accounting data. 
In those cases where the patentee failed to meet the burden of showing 
profitability, the trial court would no longer have to hear evidence and 
arguments based on commercial success. Also, recall that courts normally 
determine commercial success by “significant sales in a relevant market.”135 
 
132.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(1)(B)(ii) (“[A] court may appoint a master to . . . hold trial 
proceedings and make or recommend findings of fact on issues to be decided by the court 
without a jury if appointment is warranted by . . . the need to perform an accounting or resolve 
a difficult computation of damages . . . .” (emphasis added)); see, e.g., Smith v. Dental Prods. 
Co., 168 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1948) (death of a master). The eighty-two pages of annotations 
for FED. R. CIV. P. 53 provided in 28 U.S.C.A. (West 1992 & Supp. 2007) also illustrate this 
point. 
133.  See, e.g., Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Dart Indus., Inc., 862 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 
1988) (reviewing reasonable royalty calculated by a master); Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. 
Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1157 (6th Cir. 1978) (“[T]he accuracy of the patent owner’s 
accounting method is a ‘matter to be decided on the basis of testimony in the hearing before 
the Master.’” (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Sciaky Bros., Inc., 415 F.2d 1068, 1075 (6th Cir. 
1969))). On the importance of profits to damages, see supra Section III.C. 
134.  See, e.g., Lacks Indus., Inc. v. McKechnie Vehicle Components USA, Inc., 322 F.3d 1335 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) (delegating the issue of whether the on-sale bar invalidated claims); Festo Corp. 
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 584 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (doctrine of 
equivalents), rev’d on other grounds, 535 U.S. 722 (2002); Riverwood Int’l Corp. v. Mead 
Corp., 212 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (level of skill in the art); Desper Prods., Inc. v. 
QSound Labs, Inc., 157 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (claim construction); Newman v. Quigg, 
877 F.2d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir.), modified, 886 F.2d 329 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (patentability itself); 
Power Mosfet Techs., L.L.C. v. Siemens AG, Nos. 2:99CV168-DF, 2:OOCV208-DF, 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27560, at *37-38 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2002) (claim construction).  
135.  See sources cited supra note 51. 
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Using profitability instead would avoid the determination of either the 
“relevant” market or what constitutes “significant” sales. In the absence of 
profits, moreover, a court would have no need to expend significant resources 
on the vexing question of whether a nexus exists.136 
E. Using Profits Creates Few Incentives To Be Inefficient 
The parallels between patent and antitrust law run deep137: a patent is, after 
all, a government-granted monopoly of sorts.138 Profitability acts as a 
“secondary consideration” in antitrust as well, providing objective but indirect 
indicia of market power.139 Critics of antitrust law’s use of profits as proof 
point to its potentially perverse incentives, encouraging firms with market 
power to squander resources to appear less profitable and avoid antitrust 
liability.140 Using profitability in patent law would have the opposite effect on 
patentees and their licensees: they have every incentive to pursue efficiency in 
the hopes of proving commercial success in future litigation. 
Of course, an infringer’s commercial success can also be used by a patentee 
to show the patent’s nonobviousness. For example, in Gambro Lundia AB v. 
Baxter Healthcare Corp.,141 the patentee proved the commercial success of a 
patent on hemodialysis by noting that the infringer (i.e., the defendant) had 
sold 14,800 dialysis machines embodying the patent.142 Facing such a situation, 
infringers would indeed appear to have incentives to squander resources to 
appear less profitable and hence avoid a finding of nonobviousness. 
 
136.  Indeed, determining the existence of a nexus appears to be quite difficult. For example, 
Chisum devotes significantly more space to the case law regarding nexus than to the 
existence of commercial success itself. Compare 2 CHISUM, supra note 15, § 5.05[2][f], with id. 
§ 5.05[2][b]-[2][e]. 
137.  See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813 
(1984); George L. Priest, Cartels and Patent License Arrangements, 20 J.L. & ECON . 309, 309 
(1977). But see 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP , ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 518(b) (2d 
ed. 2002) (noting that lower courts have been moving away from presuming market power 
from patent rights). 
138.  In the future, judges, practitioners, and scholars in patent law might look to antitrust law to 
further develop their understanding of commercial success. For example, antitrust has 
developed several methods of measuring market power that courts could use to measure 
how much a patented invention differentiates a product from the rest of the market. This is 
a promising area for future research. 
139.  AREEDA & HOVENKAMP , supra note 137, ¶ 516. 
140.  See id. ¶ 516f3 (taking the “quiet life” over profits).  
141.  110 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
142.  Id. at 1579; see also Syntex (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Paragon Optical Inc., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 
1005 (D. Ariz. 1987) (measuring commercial success by sales of the infringer and patentee). 
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Three factors mitigate the impact of this incentive. First and most 
importantly, most cases involve the commercial success of the patentee, not the 
infringer.143 Second, any infringer who acts on these incentives faces an 
increased chance of being found a willful infringer, liable for treble damages.144 
Third, patent terms last only twenty years, ensuring only a limited period of 
wastefulness at most. Overall, using profits to measure commercial success 
would improve the efficiency of incentives, if it changes them at all. 
iv. an alternate normative reason to use revenue  
Part II of this Note argued that prof its should supplant revenues as the 
measure of commercial success in showing nonobviousness. This Part 
considers a normative economic counterargument, which weighs in favor of 
keeping revenues as the measure of commercial success. 
A. Normative Argument 
Commentators and economists have long recognized that the patent system 
involves a tradeoff. Society gives patentees a limited-term monopoly, which 
allows the patentee to raise prices above marginal costs to extract monopoly 
rents. This monopoly has attendant costs in terms of deadweight loss 
(potential utility which goes to neither the producer nor the consumer) and 
lessened consumer surplus (because the product gets to fewer consumers, at a 
higher price). In return, individuals and organizations get an incentive to 
produce valuable inventions.145 
Consider a typical market, where marginal costs are above zero for every 
unit sold (i.e., producing an additional unit for sale costs additional money). If 
the patentee is completely unworried about patent validity, the figure below 
demonstrates how the patentee (or its licensees) will behave. It sells at the 
profit-maximizing price, where marginal cost (MC) equals marginal revenue 
(MR). This price is above the socially optimal price, which is where the 
additional cost of producing one unit equals what a consumer will pay for it.146  
In this way, using revenues as the proof of commercial success encourages 
firms to set a price below the profit-maximizing monopoly price, thereby 
minimizing the deadweight loss to society and increasing consumer surplus. In 
 
143.  2 CHISUM, supra note 15, § 5.05[2][g]. 
144.  35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000); see also Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 
1992) (noting that willfulness typically merits treble damages). 
145.  LANDES & POSNER , supra note 22, at 11-36. 
146.  This Figure assumes no price discrimination. 
the yale law journal 117:642   2008 
674 
 
other words, jurisprudence tells patentees, “If you take less than full monopoly 
profits in the short term, you are more likely to have your patent upheld, and 
hence be more likely to maintain some monopoly profits for the full patent 
term.”147 Measuring commercial success with revenues mitigates the 
deadweight loss from granting a full monopoly to the patentee.148 
Figure 1. 
profit-maximizing patentee one hundred percent certain of validity  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
147.  Consider the following simple model for a product covered by a single patent with one 
hundred percent probability of validity, produced by the patentee, with p for price and q for 
quantity. Consider a demand curve described by p = 100 – q, and marginal cost of 
production described by p = 25 + ½ q. Differentiating and solving, we see that the patentee 
will maximize profits by producing only thirty units at seventy dollars per unit, whereas the 
socially optimal production occurs at fifty units at fifty dollars per unit. This leads to a 
deadweight loss of two hundred dollars, with the patentee reaping profits of $1125 before 
paying fixed costs. 
Now alter the model to allow for the pate nt to be invalidated, with increased 
probability of validity with increased revenues, as might happen with current commercial 
success doctrine. Specifically, the probability of enforcement equals ln(p * q * e / $2500). A 
risk-neutral patentee will maximize profits by choosing the production quantity that 
maximizes the product of this probability function with the actual profits reaped at that 
quantity. The patentee will maximize expected profitability by producing thirty-six units at 
sixty-four dollars per unit. The deadweight loss has gone down to ninety-eight dollars (a 
fifty-one percent decline), while the patentee reaps pre-fixed-cost profits of $756 (a thirty-
three percent decline). Of course, whether this completely wipes out innovation incentives 
depends entirely on the fixed costs of the patentee, including R&D costs. If those costs were 
more than $756, then this shift will leave the previously profitable patentee with a loss. 
148.  Cf. Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing 
Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 
MICH. L. REV. 985 (1999) (arguing that uncertainty and delay in the patent system may 
have net social benefits by preventing patentees from extracting full monopoly profits).  
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Figure 2. 
patentee hoping to show large revenues as proof of commercial success 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Counterargument: Unclear Tradeoffs 
Using revenues to measure commercial success reduces the ex post 
deadweight costs of granting a patent monopoly. This does not say anything, 
however, about the wisdom of this policy. These ex post costs are simply part 
of the patent tradeoff: in return for their monopoly profits, society creates 
incentives for the technological advances that drive long-term economic 
growth. In the extreme, society could reduce these ex post costs to zero by 
simply making all patents unenforceable.149 However, that would also take 
away many of the financial incentives to produce new technologies.150 
 
149.  With the inability to exclude others from using the invention, the patentee’s profit-
maximizing strategy would be to sell Qsocially optimal units at price Psocially optimal.  
150.  There are many other potential incentives to produce new technologies (e.g., being first to 
market or using trade secret protection).  
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Economists simply do not know and cannot measure the socially optimal 
level of patent protection.151 Invention is an extremely unpredictable process, 
performed by a wildly diverse group of individuals—ranging from scientists in 
large laboratories to tinkerers in their garages—who have complex motivations, 
part financial, part academic prestige, part sheer curiosity. Complicating 
matters further, patentees extract monopoly profits in a variety of manners, 
ranging from industrial production to licensing to litigation. Patentees only 
remain uniform in keeping their marginal cost structure as private as possible 
from competitors—as well as from economists. 
Since economics cannot determine whether use of revenues or profits 
provides the economically optimal incentives to invent, courts should instead 
choose the standard that leads to the most accurate nonobviousness 
determination. This Note has aimed to show that measuring commercial 
success as profits does just this. Additionally, courts might also aim for 
consistency and honoring congressional intent. Congress has clearly indicated 
that patentees have the right to extract monopoly profits as an incentive to 
invent,152 and case law has consistently honored that determination.153 
 
151.  See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS , TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG ., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENTS SYSTEM 80 (Comm. Print 
1958) (prepared by Fritz Machlup), available at http://www.mises.org/etexts/patentsystem 
.pdf (“If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our 
present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since 
we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our 
present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.”); George L. Priest, What Economists Can 
Tell Lawyers About Intellectual Property: Comment on Cheung, in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW & 
ECONOMICS  19, 24 (1986) (“I believe there is little hope that economic analysis can resolve 
the question of the appropriate scope of the protection of intellectual property.”). 
Despite his uncertainty about the patent system as a whole, Machlup did state that 
marginal changes to the system might benefit society: “[A]lthough ‘it may be impossible to 
estimate the total benefits and costs of the patent system, one may attempt to analyze the 
marginal benefits and costs of particular moderate changes in the duration, scope, or 
strength of patent protection.’” 3 FRITZ MACHLUP, THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND 
HUMAN CAPITAL 165 (1984). This Note proposes  just such a moderate change. See also 
Daniel R. Cahoy, An Incrementalist Approach to Patent Reform Policy, 9 N.Y.U.  J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 587 (2006). 
152.  For example, consider the provisions in Title 35 that allow patentees to engage in behavior 
that would otherwise run afoul of antitrust law. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000) (divvying up 
sales territory); 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2000) (tying a patented product to a separate 
product). 
153.  E.g., In re Mahurkar Double Luman Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp. 1354 
(N.D. Ill. 1993). 
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C. Counterargument: Inapplicable to Newer Industries, yet Still Inaccurate 
This Note assumed in Section IV.A th at marginal cost was consistently 
greater than zero. This assumption makes sense for many industries, such as 
heavy manufacturing, oil refining, or aerospace. In these industries, the 
revenue-maximizing incentives provided by revenue-based jurisprudence 
would indeed mitigate the ex post costs of the patent monopoly.154 
This assumption, however, does not make sense for many of the industries 
that compose an ever-greater proportion of both U.S. economic activity and 
patents issued. It costs almost nothing for Oracle to create another copy of its 
database software or for Pfizer to create another pill. These industries have 
high fixed costs for R&D, but marginal costs near zero. All firms maximize 
profits (or at least minimize losses) by producing until marginal costs equal 
marginal revenues. So, firms with marginal costs near zero will already 
produce until marginal revenues are also near zero. By definition, when 
marginal revenues are zero, the firm has maximized its revenues. 
In other words, firms with low marginal costs—even those without 
patents—already maximize their profits (or minimize losses) by maximizing 
revenues.155 Measuring commercial success as revenues provides no incentives 
to mitigate the ex post costs of a patent, while providing the fact-finder a less 
accurate proxy for nonobviousness than would using profitability.156 As the 
economy and composition of patent cases shifts away from the “old economy” 
toward high-R&D industries, using revenues will do less and less to minimize 
ex post costs, while remaining inaccurate and prone to abuse. 
conclusion  
Commercial success has become a crucial factor in determining 
nonobviousness. Courts currently accept proof for commercial success that 
comports with neither classical theory’s inferential basis for it, nor prospect 
theory’s “valuable contract rights” basis, nor congressional intent. By using 
revenues instead of profits, courts incorrectly find no commercial success in 
cases where the invention’s performance on the market should provide strong 
 
154.  As mentioned in Section IV.B., these ex post costs are the cost of the invention spurred by 
the patent system. 
155.  Maximizing profits (or minimizing losses) from a patent should not be confused with 
actually having profits from a patent, which this Note argues should be the basis for proving 
commercial success. 
156.  See supra Part II. 
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proof of nonobviousness.157 Conversely, courts will incorrectly infer 
nonobviousness from substantial revenues achieved through an unprofitable 
level of production.158 
Using profits will put little additional burden on courts and may actually 
lighten their burden. Profits are simply revenues, which courts already 
calculate, minus costs, of which businesses must keep track for tax, financial 
reporting, and management purposes. Having calculated profits in 
determining commercial success, a fact-finder who has found infringement and 
must calculate damages will often find much of the requisite data already 
available. Should a court feel it lacks the requisite accounting skill, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure provide extensive guidance on employing a special 
master. Courts could even save substantial resources by requiring the patentee 
to make an initial showing of profitability before allowing any discovery, 
motions, or arguments on commercial success.  
Commercial success has existed in patent law for over a century159 and has a 
strong basis in both Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent.160 Although 
Congress is contemplating a number of reforms to the patent system, it will 
likely leave commercial success as is.161 Since commercial success will continue 
to play a pivotal role in patent litigation, courts should move from revenues to 
profits as the primary method of proof. 
 
157.  See supra Section II.A. 
158.  See supra Section II.B. 
159.  Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486, 495 (1876). See generally Kitch, supra 
note 16 (reviewing the history of commercial success jurisprudence).  
160.  See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
161.  See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005) (not mentioning 
commercial success). But see FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION , TO PROMOTE INNOVATION : THE 
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 4, at 19 (2003), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (recommending shifting the burden of 
proof of nexus to the patentee and a case-by-case determination of relevance). 
